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"The judicial Power of th~ United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court ••• " (Article III, S:sction 1, 
clause..-:1 I) • 
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States ••• " (Article III, section 2, clause 1). 
"The Congress shall have EQif.er: q. To regulate C·o111~ 
merce with foreign Nations, and 'among .. the several States, 
and with t~e Indian Tribes; ••• " (Article· 1, section 8, 
clause 3). 
From these three clauses of t he United States Con-
.sti tution, the Supreme Court derived ·the authority_ necessary 
to make it the arbiter of United States economic affairs. 
Under the Articles of Conf,detation, ~ Congress did not 
have the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 
As a r~sult, each state attempted to protect local business 
at the expense of the other states through t he enforcing of 
trade barriers. Removal of these restrictions on commercial 
relations imposed by the "sovereign" states became one of the 
"moving purposes'' which brought about the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787. Ther e seems to be no doubt that the com-
merce clause was inserted in the Constitution to prevent the 
states from interfering with the fre edom of commercial inter-
course. 
The constitutiona l meaning of the . commerce clause has 
been developed and expanded by statutory enactments and 
through judicial interpretation. These have converted this 
clause into one - of the most important grants of authority in 
the Constitution. Justice Harlan Stone once said that the 
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"commerce clause and the wise interpretation of it, perhapa 
more tha.n any other contributing element, have united to bind 
the several states into a nation." It is largely through 
the commerce power that Congress has gained the authority to 
regulate almost every conceivable aspect of American lite. 
And the commerce powe.r continues to expand to immense pro-
portions. 
The commerce clause has a two-fold effect. (1) It is 
the greatest source of power ex-ercised by the federal govern-
merit in times of peace. (2) It is the most important limita-
tion on the powers of the states, with the exception of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, as Justice William Douglas 
noted,- the commerce clause "has a negative as · well as .a 
positive aspect. It not only serves to augment federal 
author;j.ty. By .its own force it also. cuts down the power of 
. . 
· a con~titutent sta.t.e in its exercise .of what normally would 
- . ~· ; 
be part : of its residu.ai police power. Both the positive and 
negatiVe tii.S:pectS Of the QO:qlmerce ClaUSe haVe graV~ importance.H2 
"But the Constitution Q.o.es not define ··specific 
spheres ·,af state and national authority over -inter-
state commerce •. Thus, by defa.:(ll.lt, the Supreme Court 
. 1;~ ; ~ ven the power to decide finally what the states 
.:, .. l· Jind.;-· the· ':"'t:.edera.l government may or may not d.o with 
respect to interstate commerce. In thi-s. process the 
. Court again becomes the referee between the cl~ims 
of national ·and local authorities. n3 
. . 
The foremost question concerning the commerce clause has 
been what · was the clause originally intended to mean and has 
the Court deviated from this original meaning? At different 
periods in history, different Courts have given d:H'ferent 
meanings to this clause. There havebeen · cuu.rts which wlshfd 
~. 
to .support emly the negatlv~· ·aspects of the rclause, .and 
Courts whlch supp'ort the power beine; used for positive na~ 
tional regulation. There is no way of knowing which inter-
pr:~etation was actually held by the .. :framers of the eonsti tu'ti·on. 4 
The first case to r ,each the Supreme Court ·which involved 
a con:struction of tJ:;:t:a:s clause was. the tamous. "Steamboat Oase, •t 
C3:ibbons Y.!,. Ogden,." 9, U.'S. ·1, 1824. This first case invculve.d 
-
the negatiive rather than the positive imp~ica~ion--s of the 
'commerce .clause,. This litigation gr.ew out o.f' the conflict 
between a monopolJ which the ,State of New York had conferred 
upon certain persons to. navigate, tste·ai!looa,ts :upon the water.s 
of that State and an act of Congress regulating the coastwA,. ae 
trade. The case raised directly the s 'cope of Congress 1J? 
power· over inter.state commerce .• 
Chancellor Kent of New York, in upholding the ·~onopoly 
granted by the s,ta.te against the claim of Gibbons_, oper~a.tihg 
under the authorit;Y of the f:ederal licensing act, maintained 
that Congress did no.t have any direct jUJi'isdict:r.on over i.n-
te-rna:l commerce o.r waters., Daniel W'ebster., arguing· for Gibbons 
on appeal t.b the Supreme Court, asserted that the power' of 
Congress to: regulate commerce was e~clus.i ve. CQunsel for 
' . 
the monopoly as·sert.ed that the power to regulate comm:er.ce, was 
concurrent. Webste~'s definition of commerce as comprehend~ng 
"almost gtll tne 'Qu·siness aond intercourse ·of li:fe IJ was· e~unter.>.ed 
by the defihi t:l._on of commer9e as "the transp'ortation and sa.H;· 
of commodities~"' 'Both men agreed that in case Of a collision 
of state and national power, the latter must ~revail, but 
Kent held that State power gave way only to the extent needed 
to give effect to the federal law. Therefore, navigation on 
state waters remained under state control.5 
4. 
Chief Just:1;ce John Marshall chb:ae to examine the ':nature ·:_, .· 
of national commerce power before finding the existence of 
a conflict. He rejected the r estrictive definition of commerce 
as put· forth by the counsel for Ogden in the following words : 
"Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is 
something more; it is intercourse •••• 
It~ has, we believe, been universally admitted, 
that these words comprehend every species of inter-
course between the United States and foreign nations •••• 
If this be the admitted meaning of the word in its 
application to foreign nations it must carry .the same 
meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, 
unless there be some plain intelligible cause which 
alters 1t. 11 b -
The opinion then proceeds: 
''The subject to which the power is next applied 
is to commerce 'among the several states.' The word 
'among' means intermingled with . A thing which is 
among others · is intermingled with them. Commerce 
among the States cannot stop at the external boundary 
line of ea~h State, but may be introduced into the 
interior. "'f 
"Among " meant that commerce which concerns more states 
than one. Though the states retain authority to enact, inspect, 
' pilotage, and he~lth laws, even here Congress could enter 
the field if it chose. 
What, hhowever , is Congress's power to regulate commerce? 
Marshall answers, 
-II It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe 
the rule by which commerce is to be governed . This 
power, like all others vested in Congress is -compl.e.te 
in itself, may be exercised to its-.·utmost e.Xten:t., :--arid 
acknowledge no limi tations, other than are prescribed 
in the Constitution ••• the power over commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, is 
vested in Congress as absolutely as it· would . be in a 
single government, having in its constitution the 
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as 8. are found in the Constitution of the United States." 
In the case of Gibbons .Y..t. Oe;den, .Mr, Chief Justi ·ce 
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. 
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"The appellant contends that this decree is .erroneous, 
because the laws which purport to give the exclusive ~. ~- · 
privilege it sustains are repugnant -to - the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. 
They are said to be repugnant--(1) To that clause 
in the Constitution which authorizes Congress to 
regulate comme~ce. (2) To . that which authorizes Con-
gress to P.~omote the progress of science and useful 
arts... • · 
Marshall's opinion has been called the "emancipation 
proclamation of American commerce. 11 But the Supreme Court 
did not answer the question as to whether or not the states 
had concurrent power over interstate commerce. The con-
curring qpinion of Justi.ce William Johnson maintained that 
Congress had· exclusive power over interstate commerce. 
Although Marshall was inclined to agree with Johnson's view, 
he was unwilling to hold specifically that the federal power 
over comm$rce was exclusive.lO 
In the absence of a coherently expressed doctrine, th~ 
Court continued to be plagued with problems involving the 
validity of state laws affecting forei gn or interstate commerce. 
The cases decided during much of the Taney era did not clarify 
the state of the law. Instead, the Court vacillated in a 
confused and muddled way on the extent to whicht. th.e::~ 'eommerce 
clause limited regulations of interstate commerce by tb~ 
state legislatures. Finally, in the classic cas$. of Cooley ~ 
Board of Wa.rdeps, the Supreme Court fashioned a new formula 
6. 
which combined both the exclusive and con·c-urrent doctrines. 
In short, the Court held that the commerce power is exclusive 
with respeot to · some matte~s and concu.rrertt with respect 
to others. The princip~e of' the Cooley case 1 s .still :im-
portant, but since there are so many pos.sible regulations of 
commerce, ·it is extremely difficult to apply. The r- gpi:rrion 
in the Cool~y case does not ·constitute a precise·,. aut.omatic 
rule f :or de.cidlng cases, but. it did turn the atte:n.tion. of the 
court awa,y from an ana-lysis ·of the commerce power to the _ sub-
ject . upon which the power is ·operated. However, in .ea·ch: cm.se 
the Court must now f .ace · the difficult question as to whet:P,er· 
a. particular_ subject of crommerc.ial regulation requires uni-
form and national .control or whether it is so local in char-
acter that a: state may re,gulate it •11· 
The decisions of the .Supre:me Gou.rt have made it clear 
that the 1'ptrrpose of the commerce clause was not to .preclude 
all state reguiation of commerce crossing state lines. but 
to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers: or 
obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate. or foreign ."12 
If the• subject matter allowed regulation by stat·e or loqal 
government, two que.stions .still remained: Did the state law 
discriminate against inters.tate commerce, in favor oi' l ;ocal 
crommerce? Did the state act, altho,ugh nondiscriminatory, 
place an unreas.onable burden on interstate commerce? The 
attemP,ts to answer th.ese are inevitable colored by ·a host ot 
socio-e.conomfc, fact and theo,ry, favo-red by ,judicial biras. 
Theories of federalism marched hand in hand with economic theory. 
' .. 
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Actually, the state:e passed very l'i ttl:e legislation 
designed. pri-ncipal'ly for the purpose of regulatlng interstate 
commerce o FJ:owever, mueih state legislation concern_ing· local 
matters~ ha,ppens to deal with persons or transac.tions in Xnter-
sta.te commerce, and many of these acts have been .challenged. 
on the -ground that they p:lac• unconstitut~onal burdens on 
interstate commer,ceo 
The state sometimes uses it.s npolice· power" (the power 
to protect. the public health, se,:f'ety, -morale, and general 
welfare) to burden lnterstate commerce. Thus t a sta.t_e police 
-regulation is v:a.lid only .if i ,t .does not conflict wi.th a law 
of Congress and if it. does not ili1J)Ose . an unreasonable burden 
or interstate ·commerce.13 
The power of the states to t -ax ;Sometimes have a grea·t 
impac.t . on commerce. 
· "In imposing taxes ;for state purposes a. stGLte is not 
exercising any power- which the Constitu,tion ·na.s confer.red 
upon Congre.ss. It iS only when th~ ta~-.aperates to 
reeulate commer.ce between tne sta't$S. ~t'-. w:l th fote1gn 
nations to an-extent which infringes. the authority 
confe:rred_upon Congress, that the te~.x ·can be said to 
exeeed constitutional 1im1 ta ti.On$. Form"s ~or state 
taxat.1on whose tendency i"s to probi'bit the comme,rce 
or place i.t at a .di stadva.ntage as compa"red with ·or ":tn 
competitlon, with int·raatate comm,erce, .and any state 
tax which di ~criminate't against. the commerce, are 
familiar examples of the exercise ·of' state taxing 
power in an unc.onsti.tutional manner, because· of 1 ts 
-obvious regulatory effact upon commerce .between the 
states o .• • • Not .all. state taxation is to be con-
denm"<l because-, in some manner,. it has an eff.ect upon 
comme:t'c$ between: the .states, and- the·re aFe· many forms 
of tax whose hurd ens, when 'di -str;t buted, ·thr-ough the 
play of economic forces, aff:ect interstate commerce 
whl,ch, nevertheless., fall short of the regulatia>n: 
of the comm4rce which the· Oonsti tution leaves to 
Cong:res$. r•J. 
It is not pos·sible to .formu;Late a d,efj,nite rul·e by which 
the Congr.ess may de-termine whetn.er the state police, .or 
. 8. 
t.axi:pg powers· ha.ve been ·exer:ci sed. 1!1. ·such ~a :way as to burden 
interstate commerce. Each ga:se must . :tie decided by viewing . 
its own particular· f'acts .• Neverthel·ess, with the steady 
growth of ;interstate ,comm.erce ,. partJcula:rly since 1.:890, the 
com~rc·e clause has been used with lnbr.easing frequency ·to. 
· ~~~·"J.i.date s.ta:te regl.llatory · and ta~c mea.En.tr~s. 1 5 
Aft·er 1890 two ·damlna;p:t themes b(l!lgan ·to pervade the 
app'lication of the comme;rc<5e clQ.use: use of the commerce, pow('!;r 
by Congr.ess to accomplish· bl;'o.ad s:oci:al and economic purposes; 
continuation and furth.e!'l .. develo,pment a£ ~ the commerce clause 
as a: rest~t·cttt.ibn. on st~tte srction affecting .,interstate commerce .•. 
Despite Marshall's broad intel"'pretation o.f the :fed.eral govern:-
ment '· s commerce powers:,, the de.ve,lopment of the coiJlmerce 
clause .as, a. grant of 11 posi ti ve'' J>owet>s to 'Congress. had n~ 
substantial. d:evelopnren~' until the begi-nning .of the twentieth 
century. Before this the;r>.e w~;s ''little .oct:a~.si>O:n :for tne 
·aff-irmative exerc.is.e of the. commerce power-, and ·"the influence 
of ·the oTa:u.se ~n American 1i:t'e and law was. a, n~gati.ve one. 
But .as the nation grew and the industri.al society .emerged, 
more ~a.nd mo:re Htc~l commer.cla.l matters required a ·uni:foJ>m 
sys~t~m of national legislat'ion.16 
Perhaps nowhere is .the change frf>m ·local to ma.tional 
.r-egul~tion better demonstrated than in. the case of the ·ra.11-
:t>oad.s. In 1877 the grQ1.:l.p of Grange:r cae,e s came bef.or.e the 
Supre.me· Court. The. daurt held that. the states · coU:l·d fix 
minimum ana maxi.nrum r;a;tes for' p,a.il:r~~ds and .other 1n :abs.ence 
of ·congressiotial legislation. Eut only ntne years .later j:n 
t 'he ca.se of .Wabash, St_,: Louis g:nd :PacifiC: Rad .. lroad Oo. L 
9. 
lllinois, 118 u.s. 557, 1886, repudiated its views in the 
Granger cases. The Illinois act under con,sidera.tion in the 
Wabash ca.se had 'been applied as a corrective of long- and 
short-haul rate discriminations on .shipments from Illinois to 
New York City. Th$ Court held that th• IllinQis statute, 
which imposed a penalty for lower rates on long hauls which 
extended beyond the borders of the state, was in conflict 
with the commerce 'Clause even though Congress had not legislated 
in this field. 
But if the states could not legislate and Congress had 
not done so, how were railroad rates to be controlled? The 
answer came a few_months later whe~ Congress created the 
Interstate Commerce .Commission to fi.ll the gap. The enactment 
of the Interstate Commerce Act ' of 1887 was the first example 
of the commerce clause exerting a posl ti ve influence in · 
American life and law. When the .. Sherman Anti-Trust Act was 
enacted in . l890, it manifested Congress' determination to use 
its power over interstate commerce for purposes far beyond 
anything hitherto attempted. These statutes brought with 
them a new phase of adjudication which required the Court to 
approach the interpretation of the commerce clause in the 
light of an actual ·exere'l:se of Congress of its powers under 
the· clause.17 
Difficult questions arose at t~e very beginning concerning 
the ~ app;J.icabiiity ::...Qf the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to industry 
&nd commerce. The · rationale of the Act was the contract·s, 
combinations, and conspiracies, in the form o·f a trust or 
otherwise, which restrain, or attempt to monopolize interstate 
10. 
trad~, ···t.tould be prohibited. However, when the Court first 
dealt with the Sherman Act, in United~~~~~ Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 1895, it gave little scope to the powers of 
Congress. The · Court, in the Knight case, held that the 
Sherman Act could not be applied to a. virtual monopoly of the 
sugar industry because the ma:mJ.f~ct1:1re of sugar was not in 
interstate commerce. To Chief Justi·ce Fuller the only aspect 
of commerce subject to federal regulation was transportation. 
To achieve this limitation of national power the Court re-
defined :':'commerce" so as. to practically restrict it to what 
Marshall considered its narrowest signification- 11 transportation.u 
Fuller reasoned: 
. :_ .11 Th·e~e must pe .:. a ·.~ poi'nt .. :. or -t1-me when-( a..rti·clss ~~ -~ · 
cease to be· governed exclus1vely by ·domestic law and 
begin to be governed and protected by. the nationa.~ 
.l!fW -of commercial regulation, and that moment ••• Loc.curs 
j!hen7 they eommence their final movement from the state 
of thei~ origin to that of thei~ final destination." 
In support of this limitation Of Marshall' ·S broad con-
cept of commerce, Chief Justice Fuller invented one of the 
most endurin~ formulas in tJ:ie. Court's arsenal of power crippling 
devices-that of direct and indirect effect~. Said Fuller: 
''Doubtless the power to control the manufacture 
of a given thing involves in a certain sense the ~ ~ · 
control of 1 ts .dispo.si tion, but this ia a secondary ~. .!. 
and not the primary sense; and although the exercise 
of that p·ower may result in bringing the operation 
of commerce into play,. it does not control it, and· 
affects it only incidentally and indirectly." 
In this landmark case .the Court was not enforcing the 
Constitution, n·or Chief Marshall's version of it. Rather it 
applied a · the:ory of the Union, and enthroned an economic 
dogma-laissez-faire. During the same term the Court delivered 
11. 
two other extremely conservative opinions18 which brought 
storms of pro,t~sts from large. s-egments . .of the American people 
who were now convinced that the judifil.:cay· had become the 
reacti·onary defender of e:p.tre'nched ~conomic interestELa 19 
However, even while important 6pin1ons- in this line of 
restrictive authority were being_ written, ·other cases ·called 
. 
forth broader interpretations1 of the commerce clause aes-
tined to ·supersede the earlier one.s, and to brin~ about a 
.return to the principles of Chief Justice M_arshall in Gibbons 
.Y..!; >Ogden, In Swift~ Co 1 . .Y..::. Unit·ed States, 196 u.s. 375, 
1905, the Court held that a combination of meat pac_kers was 
an. illegal monopoly under' the Sherman Act on the ground that 
their activities were transactions in interstate commerce. 
For Chief Justice Fu].ler ·' s v.iew of commerce as manuf·a.cture, 
traffic., and transportation, Justice Holmes substituted t}J.e 
realistic -'View of commerce as a 11 current." The buying and 
selling of cattle. 'Was actually part "of a single plan··;~t 
Speaking·.- f'oi' the unanimou·s Court, Justice Holmes stated that 
"~ommerce among the stat~s is notr a technicai l ·egal 
conception, but a pr·ac·tical one, drawn from th_e _cours.e 
of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a 
place in one .state, ' ·with the expectation that they 
will. end their transit, after purchase , in another_, 
ana whe11- in eff'ect they do so, ~i th only the inter~ ... 
rJ,llp,tt.btr neces·sary to find a purchase. a.t the stock- · . 
yards, · and when this. is a typica.l, constantly recurring 
course, the current thus existing is a ·curr-ent. of 
commerce among the states, and the purchase of the 
cattle ia a part and incident of such commerce,.'' 
Of ·§wift v. United States, Chief Justice Taft said in 
1922 (Board of · T;ade _of Ch.tca:fft!· v. Olsen,, 262 u.s. 1): 
"That cas.e was a milestone in the inter-
pretation of the c.ommerce qla;use of the C-e:msti tution. 
It recognized· the great .changes and development in 
the business of this vast country and drew again 
. -·"' . ~ .· 
. ; 
the dividinp; line between interstate and intra-
state commerce where the Constitution intended it 
to be. !t refused to permit local incidents of 
great interstate movement, which, taken alone, were 
intr.astate, to characterize the movement as such. 
The· Swift case merely fitted the commerce clause 
to the re~l and practical essense of modern business 
growth.-11 c 
In a series of ~ases during this same period, the Court 
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began to sustain -the use of the commerce c~ause as a basis for 
the exercise of federal poli~e powers. They clearly estab-
lis'J;led the principle that :the commerce power could be used 
to accomplish purely social objectives. In the le:~ding case 
of Champ1£n .Yo.!. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 1'903, a federal act 
prohibiting the interstate shi,pment of lottery ti .ckets was 
upheld. The Court· reasoned that the fac.ilities of interstate 
commerce were used to promot·e and spread the evi'l; so. if a 
state under its police· power could suppress lotteries within 
1 ts limits, the ·Congress, invested with the power to regulate 
interstate commerce, could provide that such commerce 11 shall 
not be polluted .by the carrying of lottery tickets from one 
state tro ·. another. tt Congress was the only autho:ri ty e.apable 
of stopping that and similiar social evile. Shortly after 
the decision in the Lottery ·case, Congress proceeded to 
enact a number of statutes which barred objectionable articles 
!'rom interstate commerce or which forbad~ the use of inter-
21 
state commerce facilities for immoral or criminal activities. 
After ~918 the Supreme Court's.restrictive interpretation 
of the commerce clause reappe~r.s in Hamme1r .!..£. Dagenhart ., 247 · 
u.s. 251, 1918. The Court, following the seriously qualified 
Sugar Trust precedent, again ,d:rew a. distinction between 
•. ,~ • & --
commerce a.nd llllil,YXl.tfac·turinGh Cong:r.esa had prohibit,ea trans-
porta.ti.on in interstate ,co·mmeJ?ce· of ;products· ·produc.~d t>~ 
.child 'l&I.oor (age ·H5 in mine a ,. a .ge .14 :tn facto~ies, or mo·re 
that 48 n.our wee_k ·ro:r t:tle ~rg~ gr.ou_l.J l4-.l6 y.eare). Ju~stic• Day 
· ch_&~act'el"iz~d. the: precedents~ invcH v1ng .l ·otteries, :focd, and 
w'I-Ti,te s.J:.,avery· a,s1 a;ttempte to· regulat~- wherr~e tra.n~portatJ: on 
was used to ae~ompi::L£h harmful r~sults; production :and 'i:ts 
incHl..ents were local mat-ters 'bey.ond the. reach o.f Congress~ 
Ret'l,lrn.ing 'to Chief Justi .ce. Fullev' s na:r\rGrw. V;i.$W Qf 
comm~rce: ·1 Just.ice Day r.easonea.:· 
11aver,. -i~1'lterstate transportat-ion, or ·i .t s in·c;J.dent :§' 
the re-gulatory power 9r Co;ng;ress1 j. s ample~ but the ·· 
p:rod:o:ctlon. ol' s..:rtie·l 'e1il, intended :f·Or inters tat~ · 
co:mrqe:rc~ ,. j~ ~- a matter of lac.al ·regulat.:ton •1' 
Day bolst,~rea. · h_i :s ne,a_~oning by ·r~c.ours~ to ~ ·theory gf 
"" ~ 
f•derS(lf sm. Ere wt>¢'>te :, 
· 
11
'lt must never be f 'or,got ten t:h@.t the na:bi.-G:n is 
made up 'O;f stat·E3.s to whic.h ar~ _:_ rwtrust~d ·th:e powe!;\s. 
of lot~a.l gov.e!':nmertt,. and to th$m the, ,!}Ower .a ·not 
ex,pressll;y .ZS·is.7deditg~~ed to the :nat1·ana1 .govern-
, m~nt. are1 reservea. ,, ·· 
. ~ "' - -·" 
In. a d1~$·enting, opl:nion, Jus.t;i.q~ Holro~s :pointed. out 
~hat. powe-r·:s rgrant.ed :ar·e. not reserved .• · Jus.tice Holfiles sai-d .: 
;·~ ~ - .. _, ~11H1~~tqu~.~ti~m-, . ~ then~; ~'- i; s ., nar~~d t©,·whether the 
:exerc:ise o~ its Qtherwi~e: con~tl,tui1onal power b;w 
Congress' can ib.e pr.onounoe.t\ ·unc.onst1.;t.uM._onal be:oause ' 
·o.f 1 ta poss.ibl~ r .eacti§.>n upQn the ¢onduqt of ·tne ,state$> 
i .n a: matter Upon which ... l have admi.tt,ed that tJ;l.~Y 
a:re free from direct cont·rol. l should. have thought 'that 
that matte:r 'had b.een dls:pas·ed o.f so ful l y a s to l 'ea:ve 
no room. ;f'o;r> idou.?Qt ,. I !Should ha:ve: thought, that the 
rno:st oonspic.u.ou·s a.~c!s1ons of thj;s court ·· ha_d made !t 
:cleat• that . the~ J;~ower to- regulit~ commerce · a.nd Qther 
consti tu~t.iona'l p·owers. could not be: ·cut do';'fn or gua.li:f'i.ed 
1:Jy ·the. fact that i:_t , might J.:nterf.ere ·with the carrying 
out .of th,e domestic. po·lic.y Qf any state. 
; •• lt · ·d.oes' ·not mat.ter whetheF the s:uppo"B e9. evf:L. 
prece·a:es or· .foJ.laws. tihe - transpcbrtat.ion • . It l.a -~nougl:l 
that, in the opinion of Congress, the transportation 
encourages the evil .••• 
The act doei not meddle with anything belonging 
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to the states, They may regulate their internal affairs 
and their domestic commerce as they like. But when 
they seek to send their products ac~oss the state line 
they are no longer within their rights. If there were 
no Constitution and no Congress their ·power to cross 
the line would depend upon their neighbors. ·Under the 
Constitution such commerce belongs not to the states 1 
but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its 
views of public· policy whatever indirect effect they 
may have upon the activities of the stati$. Instead 
of being endoUntered by a prohibitive tariff at he~ 
boundaries, the state encounters the public policy 
of the United States, which it ~s for Congress to 
express. The public policy of the United States is 
shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a 
h 1 112.) w o e... • -
The classio dissent by Justice Holmes in Rammer 1..:. 
Dagenhart was used twenty-five years later by, Justice Stone 
to overrule the majority opinion in United States .Y..:.. Darby, 
312 U;S. 100, 1941. Be wrote: 
''In the more . than .ta "Cemtury -1-1hich has .eJ.Jap.s.ed 
since the decision 6-fbbons ···.Y.:i Ggden-, . · thes.e ~ pri'neiples 
of_c~nstitutional interpretation have ~een so long 
and repeatedly recognized by this Court as applicable 
to the Commerce Clause, that there would be little 
occasion for repeating them now were it not for the 
decision of -this Court twenty-two years ago in Hammer 
L Da~nhart •.•• In that case it was held by a bare 
majority of the Court, Over the powerful and now 
classic dissent of Mr.Justice Holmes setting forth 
the fundamental issues involved, that- Congress was 
without power to exclude the products of child labo~ 
from interstate commerce. The reasoning and. conclusion 
of the _Court's opinion there cannot. e reconciled with 
the 1:lb.ncJ:usion :which we have reache. that the power 
of Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to 
exclude any article from interstate commerce subject 
only to the specific prohibition ~f the Constitution. 
. 
11 Rammer L Dagenhart has not been followed. 
The distinction on which the decision was rested 
that Congressional power to prohibit interstate 
commerce is limited to articles which in themselves 
have some harmful or deleterious property-a distinc-
tion which was novel when made and unsupported by 
any provision of the Oonstitution--has long been 
abandoned •••• 
The .c.on.clu.sion iB inescapable that Hammer v. 
Dagenhart was a ·departur..e from the princ·iples whlch 
have prevailed in th~ interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause both be.f ·ore and since the decision and that 
such vitality, .as a precedent, as it then had. has 
long since b~en exhau.sted. It should be and how is 
over;r:tU'led. "24 . . 
Thus, when the Court was confronted with the constitu:-
ti>on:aJ~1:tY .:o.t the New Deal legi.slation under t.he commerce 
clause, t~o lines of precedent were available. The Court 
could take a narrow view of the co.mmer9e clause as done in 
United States Y..:. L ct. Knight ,.co. !!±.4 in Ha.mll!e~ Y..:. Dagppha:rt. 
- '. . 
Or the Court. could take a broad view of the commerce power 
as in Gibbons V,:.. Ogden, .Swift and Go .. ]J_ United State·s, and 
United States Y..:. Da.rby,2.5 
.. . 
During the 1930~-:s the Supreme Court. was sharply divided 
b~tween the conservatl ve and liberal justices. _]?resident 
Roosevelt began working out .. the terms of his New Deal legialatton, 
and as his. legislation was enacted by Congress·~ attent.iOn 
began to vocus on the Suprem~ Court. It would be here ·that. 
the life or death d:.ecisions for the New Deal would be made. 
·In 1·936 the Supreme Court had all but wrecked the N'ew 
Deal~ In the proce-ss of in-validating ~ number of N'ew Dea~ 
proposal.s ,- ~ the Court majority opposeg vigorously any expan-
si.on of the federal, commerce· power. .The Court seemed deter-
mined, in the case Schechter Poultry Corp. Y..:.. United States, 
' i - 1 
to maintain the distinction betwee.n -commerce and l11E;nuf;ac,turine; 
as enunciate-d in the Sugar Trust case and Hammer Y...!.. Dagenhart. 
After Roosevelt's overwhelming victory in l936, he was 
determined to find a way to make t 'he Supreme Court favor.able 
•, 
16. 
to his legislation. He wa-s not sure that the .court wottld 
give ground even in view of his vote of confidence obtained 
.in the .election, therefore, Roosev~lt went to Congress earlY' 
in 1937 proposing a drastic sha.keup in the judiciary. This 
was Roosevelt's court-packing threat ·; and 1 t ran into; terrific 
publi(} opposition. .over.nlght Buprem~ Court Justices were again 
pictured as demigods far above the sw.eaty crowd, weighing public 
poli.cy on the de·licate scales of the law. ".Qonsti tut1onal1 ty:tt 
was talked about as if it ' were a tangible fact, undeviating 
and precise~ not merely the current judiciary theory of 
what ought and what ought not to be done. 
·: . , ,·:..Ye_t ln April 1937, the Su.preme Court .ruled; that the 
Schechter c~se was unapplicable and upheld the .National -Laoor 
Raltions;.Act in a series of five separate cases.. ·The first 
and most important of these ca..ses was Na.tiGnal .Labor Relations 
Board Y..!.. Jones and Laughlin St~el Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 1937. 
Here the Supreme Court gave .:tne ·interstate commerce clause 
its· maximum sweep. The Jones and Laughlin case is tne great 
modern case on the scope of federal power over interst.a.te 
commerce. Other cases involving smaller . businesses were decided 
the same day with the same results. The panoramic view of 
the Jones ~nd Laughlin case comes into view; the Uni.ted States 
consists no longer of f~rty-eight separate economic enti tie.s. 
Economically 'We are one nation, and acco-~dingly, in economic 
matters ' we stand . or fall together. 26 ·uThe Great Depression 
taught us this, and th~ Court of Nin~ Old Men confirmed it. u 27' 
Two facts must. be noted about the Wagner Act cases: 
(1) the cases were decided by the same nirie justices who had 
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'invalidated the key 'New Deal. mea.sur,es. This was made possible 
when Justice Roberts abandoned the conservatives and voted 
with the liberal group. {2). The decisions came at a time 
when Roosevelt's court-packing threat was being hotly debated. 
The .President 1 .s proposed court ref ore now seemed unnecessary. 
Since 1937, th_e federal commerce clause has continued 
to expand. It . may well be that today the interpretation of 
the fed~ral commerce clause by the Supreme Court is as broad 
a:s the economic needs of the nation. 28 
·This paper attempts to show the Supreme Court as the 
arbiter of' the economic aff'airs of this nation since the time 
of ·our Constitution in 1787. The Court's decisions inter-
preting the powers ~f -Congress under the commerce clause have 
· varied through the years depending on the attitudes of the 
justices at .the time. The·re have been periods when the Court 
would be restrictive, but the majority of the justices., over 
the .years, favored a · very broad interpretation of the commerce 
clause. The need .for this broad interpretation became in-
creasingly evident as . the · unite~ States shifted from an 
agra,ria.n to an industrial, urban society. The "Nine Old Men" 
lived up to the demands of our .changing, modern :society by 
gearing- t!leir interpretation of the federal commerce clause 
to the needs of ·the day. 
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